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540 STRONG V" STRONG [22 C.2d 
[S.F. No. 16249. In Bank. JUly 22, 1943.J 
BLANCHE HADLEY STRONG, Appellant, v. MURIEL F. 
STRONG, Respondent. 
[1] Husba.nd .and Wifc-Proper~y-Title to Community Pro ert 
LimItatIons on Power of Disposition-Wife's Joinder inPCo y 
veyance - Whe C' C d § n- , 
must join with nthelvh : ed . 172a, d~clltring ~hat the wife 
which com . us an m executmg any mstrument by 
1917, a wif~~~l~yn re~l p[~perty is. conveyed, was adopted in 
and in joining wit~ t~a h~~~:r:~t:nn the c~.mmun~ty property, 
p?-,operty she was not required to be :=:~ ~~g a. eed to such 
smce she could grant no interest. erem as grantor, 
[2] Id.-Property-Title to Community Propert -L ~~!~~f~i~~~o~~~~s P:t:~sC:a~~S!O~tio~-:wrfe's ~~ns!:f~~ 
meas d b th n WI e m realty must be 
. urd e dY e statutes in effect when the property was ac-qUire ,an where' the property w . d . ::~p:iopn in 1t927 dof Civ. ?ode, § 1~1:: d::i::r~:g &~~~h!O w~~: 
resen an equal mterest m com 't 
;ife fade9-:ately signified her consent to ~:lh~s~~~~~:tr;a~~ 
er 0 sal property to his mother by signing the deed. 
[8] Id.-:Property-Title to Communit P . 
Power of Di~position-Necessity ~or r~:::;-~;m:~:!~T:n 
purpose of ClV. Code, § 172a, was to give a wife a veto 'powe e 
over conveyances of communit t r her and s· h . yproper y disadvantageous to 
ing'to sig::e ~ ed can exe~clse thIS power effectively by refus-
for more elabor::e ;~:C:1::' such property, there is no need 
[4] Id. - Property - Title to C . 
Avoid Transfers-Time to s::m~~~ra~~:pe~AAt' ctions to 
fenses.-In an a t' t " 0 c Ions-De-
defendant's divo:c~~n h:ab~~~t d~!~: t~hpropert! acquired by 
deeded by him to plaintiff his th g e marriage and later 
sert her rights to the prop~rty :~ere6i~~~::ean§t1m72ay ndotlas-
, a, ec ar-
[2J See ~ CaI.Jur. Ten-year SuPp. 593, 626' 11 A J 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3J Husband' IlI:' ur.209. 
[2] Husband and Wife §§ 96 103(2)' [4J aid Wife, § 103(2) ; 
§§ 108(2)' Limitation of A .' , usband and Wife, 
§108(2)' '[6J Li 't t' chons, § 49; [5J Husband and Wife 
[8] Quieting Tit~ § ~~~ [~t~io~s, ~ 135; [7J. Pleading, § 268(5); 
ing Title, § 83; [10] Fr'aud § 9~s. [~ltQd .W,lfe, §.195(5); Quiet-
Fraudulent Conveyances, § (H; Sheriffs, § ~~:tmg Title, § 83; [12J 
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ing that no action to avoid a conveyance of community real 
property in which the wife has not joined shall be commenced 
after the expiration of one year from the time of recording 
such instrument, where the deed to plaintiff was recorded sev-
eral years before commencement of the action. It was imma-
terialthat the wife had brought no action to avoid plaintiff's 
deed, since statutes of limitation, although commonly phrased 
in terms restricting only the commencement of actions" apply 
to causes of action raised by the defendant. 
[5] ld. - Property - Title to Community Propertr-Actions to 
Avoid Transfers-Time to Sue.-,.-The recipient of, a deedexe-
cuted by the husband alone obtains a voidable interest,and 
the object of the one-year limitation in Civ. Code, § 172a, is.to 
make that interest absolute after that time, just as statutes 
barring actions for the recovery of real property are usually 
construed to create a new title in the adverse possessor and to 
terminate the interest of the paper titleholder. 
[6] Limitation of Actions-Pleading-Necessity of Pleading Stat-
ute.-A party relying on the iiefense of the statute of limit~ 
tions must plead it. , 
[7] Pleading-Issues and Proof-Ownership.-A plea of owner-
ship is sufficient to permit proof of a title acquired as a result 
,of the running of the statute of ,limitations. 
[8] Quieting Title-Pleading-Fraud.-The general rule that fraud \ 
must be specifically pleaded applies particularly to quiet title 
actions. 
[9] Husband and Wife-Actions-Pleading:, Quieting Title-Is-: 
sues.-In an action to quiet title to property acquired by de-
fendant's divorced husband during the' marriage. and later 
deeded by him to plaintiff, his mother, any rights thatdefen-
dant might have to the cancellation of the deed or to the dec-
laration of a constructive trust are, entirely equitable, and 
such rights cannot be established in a quiet title action when 
the pleadings contain merely general allegations asserting de-
fendant's ownership and denying that of plaintiff. ' 
[101 Fraud:--Findings.-A judgment is not supported by proof of 
fraud if there is no finding of fraud. 
[11] Quieting Title-Issues-Fraudulent Conveyances.-The rules 
of pleading governing cases of conveyances in fraud of credi-
tors have no bearing on a quiet title suit which does not in-
volve such a conveyance. 
[8] See 12 Ca1.Jur. 800; 22 Ca,1.Jur. 152; 24 Am.Jur. 71. 
[10] See 24 Cal.Jur. 935. 
4, 
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[12] Fraudulent Conveyances-Validity of Transfer as Against 
Creditors: Sheriffs-Actions-Plcading-Issues and Proof.-
A creditor may levy t'xecution on the property fraudull'ntly 
conveyed itS if there had been no convey:mee, and a shrriff 
who is sued for conversion hy virtue of such Itn execution may 
prove, under It denial of the grantee's title, that the conveyance 
was fraudulent. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Frank M. Ogden, Judge. Reversed. 
, Action to quiet title. Judgment for defendant reversed. 
Kenneth J. Carey and Henderson & Henderson for Ap-
pellant. 
Snook & Snook & Chase and Samuel J. Chase for Respon-
dent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This action was brought by plaintiff 
Blanche Hadley Strong against defendant Muriel F. Strong 
to quiet title to a house and lot in the city of Oakland. The 
property was conveyed on December 16, 1925, by June Wadey 
to Lester H. Strong, at that time the husband of defendant 
Muriel F. Strong, and the deed was recorded on January 6, 
1926. The purchase was made at least in part with com-
munity funds. In 1932 a grant deed was executed and deliv-
ered to plaintiff Blanche Hadley Strong, mother of Lester 
~. Strong. Both Lester H. Strong and Muriel F. Strong 
SIgned and acknowledged the deed, but only Lester H. Strong 
was .named therein as grantor. Muriel F. Strong .was induced 
to SIgn the deed by her husband's representatIOns that he 
was in financial difficulty, that the conveyance was made for 
the protection of their home, and that there would shortly 
be a reconveyance to them. ,The deed was recorded on April 
14, 1932. On January 14, 1938, Muriel F. Strong was granted 
a divorce and was awarded the house and lot, formerly the 
home of the family and subsequently the home of her two 
children and herself. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment 
in favor of the defendant. 
The divorce decree could pass no interest to defendant 
unless the deed could not be enforced against her,so inquiry 
must first be directed at the effectiveness of the conveyance 
to plaintiff in 1932. [1] Defendant invokes section 172a of 
the Civil Code, providing that the wife' must join with the 
July 1943] STRONG v. STRONG [22 C.2d 540] 
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husband in executing any instrument by which "community 
real property or any interest therein is leased for a longer 
period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered. 
. . ." Defendant contends that in order to join in executing 
the deed the wife must be named therein as grantor. 
Two e~rlY cases, lngoldsby v. Jv.an, 12 Cal. 564, and Dent-
zel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138, involved legislation providing that 
a conveyance of the wife's separate property must 'be signed 
by the husband, that such a conveyance must be by jo!nt 
deed, and that it must be executed by husband and wife. 
(Hittel General Laws of California, (1872) pp. 103, 105, 
516.) This court held that the husband complied with these 
statutes by signing the deed, on the ground that it would be 
unreasonable to expect a husband who had no interest to 
convey to be a formal grantor. It declared that. the husband 
was required to join merely to give or withhold his assent to 
the transfer, and that he gave his assent by signing the deed. 
The same reasoning applies to Civil Code section 172a. 
When that section was adopted in 1917, a wife had no legal 
interest in the community property (Spreckels v. Spreckels, 
172 Cal. 775 [158 P. 537] ; Estate of Dargie, 179 Cal. 418 
[177 P. 165]; Lahaney v. Lahaney, 208 Cal. 323 [281 P. 67] ; 
McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557 [269 P. 519]; Stewart v. 
Stewart, 199 Cal. 318 [249 P. 197]), and since she could grant 
no interest, the Legislature could hardly have intended her 
to act as grantor. [2] The rights of the husband and wife 
must be measured by the statutes in effect when the property 
was acquired (McKay v. Lauriston, :supra; Ldhaneyv. La~ 
haney, supra),' and as the property in this case was acquired 
before the adoption in 1927 of Civil Code section 161a 
providing that the wife has a "present, existing, and equal" 
interest in community property, the wife adequately signified 
her consent to the transfer by the husband by ,'signing the 
deed. (Riley v. Gordon, 137 Cal.App. 311 [30 P.2d 617]; 
see 3 Cal.Jur.TenYr.Supp. 593.) Since the provisions of 
section 172a were the same in 1927 as in 1917 with respect 
to a wife's joining in a conveyance of community property, 
it is unlikely that any alteration in this meaning was in-
tended in 1927. 
Defendant relies on Oordano v. Wright, 159 Cal. 610 [115 
P.227, Ann. Cas. 1912C 1044], Roberts v. Abbott, 48 Cal. 
App. 779 [192 P. 345], and Ohilds v. Newfield, 136 Cal.App. 
217 [28 P.2d 924], holding that if several persons sign a 
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d'aed, some of whom are not named therein as grantors, only 
those so named convey their interest in the property granted. 
In distinguishing Ingoldsby v. Juan, and Dentzel v. Waldie, 
however, the court in Cordano v. Wright made it clear that 
those cases were correctly decided, and that a person without 
any legal interest in the property granted could by signing 
.8 deed comply with a statute requiring that he join in its 
execution. The rule in Cordano v. Wright had its origin in 
the fact that at common law deeds were not signed but sealed, 
and identification of the grantor was therefore required in 
the body of the deed. Even after seals were replaced by 
signatures and t;he rule became unnecessary it was still applied 
mechanically. (Elliot v. Sleeper, 2 N.H. 525.) Several courts, 
however, have refused to adhere to the rule now that it has 
lost its reason for being. (Sterling v. Park, 129 Ga. 309 [58 
S.E. 828, 121 Am.St.Rep. 224, 12 Ann.Cas. 201, 13 L.R.A.N.S. 
298] ; Agar v. Streeter, 183 Mich. 600 [150 N.W. 160, Ann.Cas. 
1916E 518, L.R.A. 1915D 196]; Hrouska v. Janke, 66 Wis. 
252 [28 N.W. 166]; Elliot v. Sleeper, supra. See Blake v. 
Hedriok, 94 W.Va. 761 [120 S.E. 906]; Runyan v. Snyder, 
45 Colo. 156 [100 P. 420].) Certainly it should not be ap-
plied where there is no occasion for even its mechanical appli-
cation. [3] The purpose of section 172a was to give a wife 
a veto power over conveyances of community property disad-
vantageous to her (Stewart v. Stewart, supra) and since she 
can exercise this power effectively by refusing to sign the 
deed, there is no need for more elaborate procedure. . 
[4] Defendant, moreover, asserts her rights under section 
17211. too late. At the time the property was acquired this 
·section provided that no action to avoid a conveyance of com-
munity real property in which the wife had not joined" shall 
be commenced after the expiration of one year from the :filing 
for record of such instrument in the recorder's office in the 
county in which the land is situate." (Stats. 1917, p. 829.) 
The deed to plaintiff was recorded several years before the 
commencement of this action. It is immaterial that the wife 
has brought no action to avoid plaintiff's deed but invokes 
section 172a as defendant in a quiet title suit, for statutes 
of limitation, although commonly phrased in terms restrict-
ing only the commencement of actions (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 
sec. 335 et seq.), apply to causes of action raised by the de-
fendant. (Hermosa Beach etc. Co. v. Law Credit Co., 175 Cal. 
493 [166 P. 22] ; Bradbury v. Higginson, 167 Cal. 553 [140 
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P. 254] ; Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister [Estate Co.], 3 Cal.2d 
740 [47 P.2d 273] ; Bliss v. Sneath, 119 Cal. 526 [51 P. 848]:) . 
"A title which will not sustain a declaration will not sustaIn 
a plea." (Holmes, J., in Chapin v.Freeland, 142 Mass. 383 
[8 N.E. 138, 56 Am.Rep. 701].) Defendant, despite. her plea 
of ownership,· seeks in fact to pre.vail on the bas~s. of a ca~ 
of action to avoid plaintiff's deed, a cause of action on which 
the statute has run. 
[5] Defendant's argument that the statute should not bar 
this cause necessitates the assumption that 1728. should be 
construed more strictly than the usual statute of limitations. 
The reverse is true. The recipient of a deed executed by the 
husband alone obtains a voidable interest. The. object of the 
one year limitation in section 172a is to make that·interest 
absolute after that time just as statutes barring' actions for 
the recovery of real property are usually construed to create 
a new title in the adverse possessor and to terminate the 
interest of the paper titleholder. (See Ballantine, Title by 
Adverse Possession, 32 Harv.L.Rev. 135; Tiffany on Real 
Property (3rd ed.) section 1133, et seq.; Restatement: Prop-
erty, Introductory Note to chapter 15.) It is not reasonable 
to suppose that the Legislature intended to make the grantee's 
right to the property dependent on the chance of the wife's. 
appearing as plaintiff rather than defendant. 
It is II.lso contended that plaintiff waived the limitation un-
der 172a on defendant's cause of action. [6] It is true 
that a party relying on the defense of the statute of limita-
tions must plead it. (See Union Sugar Co. v. HolUster Estate 
Co., 3 Ca1.2d 740 [47 P.2d 273].) [7J Plaintiff, however, 
pleaded that she owned the property, and a plea of ownership is 
sufficient· to permit proof of a title acquired as a result. of 
the running of the statute of limitations. (Jordan v. Beale, 
172 Cal. 226 [155 P. 990] ; Carbarino v. Noce, 181 Cal. 125 [183 
P. 532, 6 A.L.R. 1433] ; Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484 [137 
P. 260] ; Gray v. Walker, 157 Cal. 381 [108 P. 278] ; Monte-
cito Valley Co. v. Santa Barbara, 144 Cal. 578 [77 P. 1113] ; 
Merrill v. Hooper, 125 Cal.App. 80 [13 P.2d 786] ; Rowe v. 
Wurster, 50 Cal.App. 196 [194 P. 725].) 
[8] Defendant contends that the judgment quieting title 
in her should be affirmed on the ground that she was induced 
by her husband's false representations to sign the deed.De-
fendant did not plead fraud, however, although the general 
22 0.24-18 
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rule that fraud must be specifically pleaded (see cases cited 
in 12 Cal.Jur. 800, et seq.) applies particularly to quiet title 
.actions. (Thompson v. Moore, 8 Ca1.2d 367, 372 [65 P.2d 
800, 109 A.L.R. 1027] ; Maison v. Puntenney, 212 Cal. 134, 
137-139 [298 P. 33] ; Carpenter v. Smallpage, 220 Cal. 129, 
133 [29 P.2d 841, 30 P.2d 995] ; Burris v. Adams, 96 Cal. 664, 
.667-668 [31 P. 565] ; Davies v. Symmes, 49 Cal.App.2d 433, 
445-446 [122 P.2d 102].) [9] Defendant, moreover, is not the 
Jegal owner, for title passed on execution of the deed. (See 
cases cited in 12 Cal.Jur. 723.) Any rights that she might 
have to the cancellation of the deed or to the declaration of 
a constructive trust are entirely equitable (Rocha v. Rocha, 
197 Cal. 396 [240 P. 1010] ; Farrar v. Steenbergh, 173 Cal. 
94 [159 P.707] ; Freligh v. McGrew, 95 Cal.App. 251 [272 
P. 791]; Walsh, Equity, 492), and it is settled that such 
rights cannot be established in an action to quiet title when the 
pleadings contain merely general allegations asserting de~ 
fendant's ownership and denying that of plaintiff. (Aalwyn's 
Law Institute v. Martin, 173 Cal. 21, 26 [159 P. 158] ; Robin-
son v.Muir, 151 Cal. 118, 124 [90 P. 521]; County of Los 
Angeles v. Hannon, 159 Cal. 37,48 [112 P. 878, Ann.Cas. 1912 
B 1065]; Reilly v. Wright, 117 Cal. 77, 80 [48 P. 970].) 
[10] In the present case there was not only no pleading, 
but no finding of fraud, and a judgment is not supported by 
proof of fraud if there is no finding of fraud. (Taylor v. 
Taylor, 192 Cal. 71 [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074] ; Floyd v. 
Tierra Grande Dev. Co., 51 Cal.App. 654[197 P. 684] ; Code 
Civ. Proc.§ 632; see .cases cited in 24 Cal.Jur. 935 et seq.) 
Any issue of fraud in this lawsuit entered through the evi-
dence admitted, not through the pleadings. The findings are 
made substan~ially in the language of the pleadings and do 
not include issues not raised by them. (Taylorv. Taylor, 192 
Cal. 71, 81 [218P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074].) 
[11] The rules of pleading governing cases of convey-
ances in fraud of creditors have no bearing on the present 
case, which does not involve such a conveyance. (Cf. Howe v. 
Johnson, 107 Cal. 67 [40 P. 42] ; Banning v. Marleau, 121 Cal. 
240 [53 P. 692] ; Mason v. Vestal, 88 Cal. 396 [26 P~ .213, 22 
Am/St.Rep.310] ; Grum v. Barney, 55 Cal. 254; Bird v. Mur-
phy~ 72 Cal.App. 39 [236 P. 154] ; Sellers v. Neil, 47 Cal.App. 
2d 128 [117 P.2d 390].) Such conveyances are void as against 
qr~di~ors, under the express terms of Civil Code section 3439, 
fueffectwhen the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was 
July 1943] STRONG v. STRONG 
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adopted in 1939, and of Civil Code section 3439.09, in effect 
thereafter. [12] A creditor may levy execution on the prop-
erty as if there had been no conveyance. (Grum v. Barney~ 
supraj Mason v. Vestal, supraj see Bird v. Murphy, supra), 
and a sheriff who is sued for conversion by virtue of such an 
execution may prove, under a denial of the grantee '8 title, 
that the conveyance was fraudulent. (Howe v. Johnson, 
supraj Banning v. Marleau, supraj Mason v. Vestal, supraj 
Grum v. Barney, supra.) A conveyance may be in fraud of 
creditors because it was a gift by an insolvent donor (Civil 
Code § 3439.04), or was designed to put the property beyond 
the reach of creditors (Civil Code § 3439.04), or; in the case 
of personal property, because it was. not followed by immedi-
ate delivery. (Civil Code § 3440.) The fraud that entitles a 
party to rescind a transfer, however, is altogether different 
for it is based on false representations inducing reliance, and 
thus involves different considerations of policy and different 
legal consequences. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J. and Schauer, J., concurred. 
CURTIS, J.-I dissent. As a preliminary point of discus-
sion it is necessary to advert briefly to the presentation and 
?ispositio~ of this litigation in the trial court. The plead-
Ing~ are In the usua! short form appropriate to quiet title 
actIo~s. The. complamt alleges the plaintiff's ownership of 
certaIn descrIbed real property. and the defendant's assertion: 
of an interest therein adverse to the plaintiff. The defendant 
in her answer denies all the averments of the ·complaint 
except as. to her adverse claim, which she admits but she 
denies that such claim is without right· in this· c~nnection: defend~nt alleges that she is the owne; and rightfully in 
posseSSIOn ·of the property and prays that.title be quieted in. 
her. T~e case was tried by the court sitting without a jury. 
FollOWIng the general form of the allegations contained in 
the parties' respective pleadings, the trial court in· its find-
ings resolved the adverse claims of ownership in favor of the 
defendant and judgment was entered in accordance with that· 
adjUdication of the title to the property. Such determination 
rests upon the inefficacy of the deed of 1932 to sustain the 
plaintiff's cause of action. 
The following review of the record will demonstrate the 
propriety of the trial court's decision: While the defendant 
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admitted signing the deed in question, she consistently main-
tained that she had no intention of "passing the title" or 
giving away [her] home" or "passing any interest" to the 
plaintiff. It appears that the defendant knew the instrument 
was drafted in favor of her mother-in-law, but that because 
of her ill health the defendant did not read the document 
. and relied solely on her husband's statement that the trans-
action was "merely for convenience" and a reconveyance by 
his mother would immediately follow. Illustrative of the de-
fendant's understanding of the matter are these excerpts from 
her testimony: In answer to th'3 question "What did your 
husband tell you" when the deed was execlited, the defend-
ant upon direct examination testified: "That he wanted me 
to sign this deed to his mother merely for a convenience; that 
very shortly it would be put back in my name, and the other 
paper I signed [at the same time] he told me that was the 
deed giving it back to us. I did not read either document 
due to my condition." On cross-examination when queried 
as to the identity of the two documents she claimed to have 
signed contemporaneously the defendant stated. "One he told 
me was giving the house to his mother and the otber was his 
mother giving it back to me." Wben asked as to what reason 
her husband gave her for negotiating the transfer, the de-
fendant answered: "He said he was in some business difficulty 
and he didn't want the home taken from his two children 
and his wife-he wanted to safeguard us." Confirmatory of 
the defendant's understanding of the affair is tbe fact that 
her possession and enjoyment of the property was in nowise 
disturbed as the result of this deed. At tbe trial the defend-
ant's husband, Lester H. Strong, admitted that he told the 
defendant when she signed the deed that such transfer was 
necessary because of financial difficulties. . 
Also of some pertinency in thi., connection is the evidence 
relating' to the matter of consideration in support of the dis-
puted conveyance. At the trial the plaintiff attempted to 
correlate tbe transaction here involved, with her action some 
ei!!ht weeks later in deeding two pieces of real estate to her 
son, Lester H. Strollg.Althoul!h the latter was called to 
testify on behalf of the plaintiff, he was not asked to corro-
borate his mother's claim as to the issue of consideration. It 
appears that the defendant did not know of these later con-
veyances to her husband, and she, therefore, was unable to 
testify as to their purpose. However, she did state that at 
the time in question the plaintiff was financially interested 
July 1943] STRONG' 'V. STRONG 
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in, certain business ventures of ,Lester Ii. Strong and con-
cerned with their successful outcome. On cross-examination 
the plaintiff admitted that she frequently gave her son money 
or property on which he might obtain loans to relieve pressing 
financial obligations. In view of the significant discrepancy 
between the respective dates of the mentioned deeds; the nat" 
ural as. well as business relationship between the plaintiff 
and Lester H. Strong, and theconflic'ting possibilities' as to . 
. th~ object of the plaintiff's transfer of realty to her son, the 
trIal court, having the advantage of 'observing the demea:nor 
of the parties on the witness-stand, apparently elected. to dis-
credit the plaintiff's claim as to the existence of any connec-
tion between the successive conveyanceS and concluded that 
they were independent transactions, not intended as consid-' 
eration one for the other. In accord with the settled rule that 
it is within the exclusive province of the triai court to pass 
ripon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence, the implied finding against the plaintiff on the issue 
of consideration would not be disturbed on appeal. 
From this state of the record it can readily be inferred that 
the defendant was induced to sign the deed of 1932 solely by 
reason of the persuasion and misleading explanation of her 
husband as to the feigned nature of the transfer; that she 
never realized the full significance or import of the instru-
ment, but that she had implicit trUst in her husband's man-
agement of their business affairs and accepted What he said 
without question; and that the confidence she reposed in him 
was betrayed in an attempt to consummate a conveyance of 
their community real property to her detriment. Thus, there 
was an absence of actual consent to the transfer on the part of 
the defendant, and under the prevailing circumstances the 
plaintiff is not in a position to urge the binding force Of the 
defendant 'ssignature to the deed as an unchallengeable mani-
festation of assent to the conveyance. While it does not appear 
that the plaintiff took part in the procurement of the deed 
the equities of the case support the defendant's claim to re: 
lief upon the basis of her husband's breach of his fiduciary 
duty to protect her interests and the want of·consideration in 
support of the transfer. From this aspect the present situation 
is akin in principle to those cases wherein a gift, grant or be-' 
quest obtained by undue influence of a third person is vitiated 
thereby, and it is held immaterial that in the procurement 
550 STRONG V. STRONG [22 C.2d 
thereof the immediate beneficiary did not participate. (Moore 
v. Moore, 81 Cal. 195 [22 P. 589, 874] ; see cases collected in 
96 A.L.R. 613-615.) 
The majority opinion holds that these evidentiary matters 
would have no bearing upon the determination or this appeal 
because the defendant did not plead the fraudulent character 
of the deed nor did the trial court make a finding based there-
on. However, such omissions in the record do not militate 
against the propriety of the judgment nullifying the operative 
effect of the conveyance to the plaintiff in 1932~ In a quiet 
title suit, unlike other actions generally, a defendant under b 
general denial may raise the issue that the plaintiff acquired 
title in whole or in part through a fraudulent transfer af-
fecting her claim of title thereto. (12 Cal.Jur. §95, p. 1056; 
Howe v. Johnson, 107 Cal. 67 [40P. 42] ; Banning v. Marleau, 
121 Cal. 240 [53 P. 692]; Bird v. Murphy, 72 Cal.App.39 
[236 P. 154] ; Sellers v. Neil, 47 Cal.App.2d 128 [117 P.2d 
390].) Nor after consideration of this point was the trial court 
required to make a special finding thereon. As previously 
stated, the complaint and answer are in the conventional 
style suitable to this type of litigation, and the findings are 
responsive to the general form of the pleadings. The issue as 
to the fraudulent nature of the conveyance arose merely in 
the evidence at the trial. Findings of fact are sufficient if they 
follow the language of the pleadings. (Dam v. Zink, 112 Cal. 
91 [44 P. 331] ; Vasey v. Oampbell, 4 Cal.App. 451 [88 P. 
509] ; Biurrun v. Elizalde, 75 Cal.App. 44 [242 P. 109] ; also, 
see cases collected in 24 Cal.Jur. §213, p. 984.) Ownership of 
the property by the defendant was the ultimate fact which 
was alleged in the answer and which was set forth in the 
findings. (Hitchcock v. Rooney, 171 Cal. 285 [152 P. 913] j 
Hannah v. Oanty, 175 CaL 763 [167 P. 373].) In reviewing 
the sufficiency of the findings to support a judgment, regard 
will be had to the ultimate facts and not to mere 'probative 
facts. (2 Cal.Jur. 872, and cases cited in Ten Year Supp.) 
The majority opinion further holds that the defendant is 
not now in a position to question the validity of the deed to 
the plaintiff because the time limit of one year from the date 
of recordation of the instrument, the period specified in sec-
tion 172a as available for the wife's exercise of her right to 
u.void an unauthorized conveyance, had expired several years 
before the commencement of this quiet title action. However, 
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this statement of the law has no application .• hen the validity 
of the deeq is questioned on the ground of. fraud rather than 
non-compliance with the terms' of section 172a. A statute of 
limitations is a special defense which may be either relied 0:0. 
or waived at the election of a party entitled to avail herself 
of it, and, if not specially made, it will be deemed to have 
heen waived. (16 Cal.Jur. §232, p. 640; Estate of Garcelon, 
104 Cal. 570 [38 P. 414, 43 Am.St.Rep. 134, 32 L.R.A. 595] ; 
Bliss v. Sneath, 119 Cal. 526 [51 P. 848]:) Conceding that the 
general form of the pleadings in this action did not permit the 
plaintiff's assertion of a time limitation by formal plea and 
that without such preliminary foundation she could have 
urged such bar in the trial court in avoidance of the defend-
ant's claim to relief, it does not appear from the record that 
the plaintiff did in fact present the point there; Consequently 
such matter should not be considered for the first time 6n ap-
peal. (Estate of Garcelon, supra; Moore v. Oopp, 119 Cal. 
429 [51 P. 630] j Bliss v. Sneath, supra.) The rule governing 
such situation, where the formal plea of the statute of limita.-' 
tions is unnecessary in order to introduce evidence thereon at 
the trial, is stated in the case of Union Sugar 00. v. Hollister 
Estate 00.,3 Cal.2d 740, 745 [47 P.2d 273] : "However, it 
has been held that unless the adverse party invokes the plea 
of the statute at the trial, and brings to the attention of the 
trial court his purpose to offer evidence in support of such 
plea, the court cannot assume that he desires to make any 
such defense, and he cannot invoke the plea for the first time 
on appeal. [Citing authorities.] '1 . 
Consistent with this review of the record herein, the de-' 
fendant is entitled to relief from the operative effect· of the 
disputed conveyance. In my opinion the judgment should be 
affirmed. . 
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August 
19, 19~3. Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a 
rehearmg. 
